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ABSTRACT

One hundred male and female undergraduate students served as
mock jurors.

Subjects read four automobile accident summaries.

For

each case, subjects judged the defendant's responsibility, the plain
tiff 's responsebility, and evaluated the severity of consequences.
In each case, the deservingness of the victim to suffer, and the
severity of the accidental consequences were varied.

In addition, a

median split was done on subjects' locus of control scores to define
a third treatment variable.

Therefore, the study was a 2 (Internal

vs. External) x 2 (High Severity vs. Low Severity) x 2 (High Deserv
ingness vs. Low Deservingness) mixed factorial design.

Results

indicated that subjects compensated plaintiffs and defendants in line
with hypotheses derived from equity theory for the distribution of
rewards and punishments.

Specifically, defendants received harsher

punishments when the accident consequences were more severe for the
plaintiff than for less severe consequences.

However, when plaintiffs

were in high deservingness to suffer situations (intoxicated but
just below legal limit) compensation was less than for more respec
table plaintiffs in low deservingness to suffer situations (non
drinking).

Subjects' locus of control scores were found to only

affect the extent that responsibility was derogated to plaintiffs.
That is, externals attributed more responsibility to plaintiffs than
internals.

Results are discussed with regard to equity theory.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

To date there have been numerous studies that have dealt with
attribution of responsibility by observers for victims of unwarranted
consequences.

These studies have been attempts to determine the

underlying factors that account for differences for the manner that
observers attribute responsibility.

Two prominant approaches have

emphasized individual differences, that is, the extent that a person
believes the world is just, and the belief in personal causation as
regards to the lots of others.

This present study reviewed earlier

studies that dealt with attribution of responsibility, and then
examined more closely those studies concerned with personality variables
that effect responsibility attribution.

Then a suggestion was offered

in order to better understand the reason individuals differ for their
attribution of responsibility to another.
Attribution of Responsibility
There is evidence that things that happen to another person, even
when these events are beyond the other’s control, may have a large
effect on our own attitudes toward him.

While Walster (1966) proposed

that when individuals hear about an accident, they will be sure to
blame someone for the accident; Lerner (1965. 1966)- argued that people
are motivated to believe in a njust world," where people "get what
they deserve, and deserve what they get."
.Walster (1966) in addition to proposing that people desire to
blame others for accidental consequences they encounter in order to
have the world seem, to be a predictable place, also predicted that the

2
tendency to assign responsibility to someone will increase as the
magnitude of the consequences.increase.

The assignment of responsi

bility occurs through a process Walster called defensive attribution.
She argued that it is easy for the observer to feel sympathy for the
sufferer of a small loss and attribute the misfortuen to chance.

How

ever, for an observer to attribute a severe accidental outcome to
chance implies that a catastrophe of equal magnitude could happen to
themself.

Alternatively, by derogating the responsibility of the

grave outcome to the victim, the perceiver is convinced that they are
a different kind of person from the victim, or would have behaved
differently under the circumstances, the observer can reassure them
self of being protected from a similar catastrophe.
Walster (1966) tested this hypothesis by describing a high school
student's driving habits to a group of subjects.

Subjects were asked

to asses the responsibility of the driver whose parked and empty
automobile was involved in an accident when it rolled down a hill.
In her description, she varied the severity of the accident that was
said to have resulted from the same pre-accident behavior.

The

accident conditions ranged from damage only to the car with no harm
to others, and damage to the car with the possibility of Injury to
others.

Walster*s (1966) findings were in accordance with the predicted

attribution of responsibility.

Sex differences indicated that women

were more likely to assign more responsibility as the possible conse
quences of the accident were increased.
offered by Walster.

However, no explanation was

Furthermore, the results indicated that the

student’s behavior was judged to be more "morally unacceptable" the
more severe the consequences were said to be for both men and women.
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The plausibility of Walster*s (1966) prediction for the increased
assignment of responsibility as the magnitude of the severity of conse
quences increases has been explored in a line of research by Lerner
and his associates (Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner &
Simmons, 1966),
Lerner (1965, 1967) proposed that people need to believe in a
just world and that they are motivated to distort reality in order to
maintain the belief that such a world is indeed just.

The research

supported the notion that a person takes into account the outcomes of
a social event in making sense out of what he has observed even when
the outcome is fortuitously related to behavior.

Lerner and his asso

ciates (Lerner & Simmons, 1966) asserted that the motive to distort
reality leads individuals to derogate and blame people who have suffered
by devaluation and refection even if this suffering haS occurred pre
sumably for a sufferer who is innocent of responsibility.

Sex of

subject was not examined in Lerner*s early studies (Lerner, 1965, 1966,
1967) since only female subjects were used for his formulation of the
just world notion.
Lerner and Matthews (1967) asserted that the underlying process
postulated in Lerner*s (1965, 1966) earlier studies was based on a
person's need to believe in a just world in which people deserve their
fate.

Furthermore, they reasoned that a person's fate is a result of

what that person does, and it is only when an observer cannot attribute
some misdeed to a suffering victim that the observer will derogate the
victim as an undersirable person.

Lerner argued that derogation as

a distortion of reality was a result of the observer's desire to avoid
such misfortune himself and. to maintain a view that the world-is just.

However, Lerner, Miller, and Holmes (1976) stated that observers of
what appears' to be unjust suffering do not necessarily resort to
derogation of a victim automatically and uniformly.

Among the poten

tially numerous means by which an individual may restore his concept
of a just world include compensation and/or punishment of a tormenter;
the victim may be blamed without being devalued; and/or the observer
may deny that the suffering has even occurred.

Lerner et al.

(1976)

suggested that compensation of an innocent victim is generally the
preferred method.

However, when an individual is unable to alter the

state of affairs, a comfortable solution to reduce the sense of
injustice is to ultimately devalue the victim.

Kenrick, Reich, and

Ciaidini (1976) have shown that both compensation and derogation may
be used; therefore, not to be taken necessarily as being mutually
exclusive.
One theory that may be likened to the just world theory is that
of social exchange, in particular, equity theory (Adams, 1963» 1965).
The concern of equity theory is the manner that an individual responds
to an injustice, such as by an. attempt to restore actual equity, or
equal relative outcomes for those persons involved.

Alternatively,

an individual may.respond by distorting reality as suggested by a just
world notion, in order to restore psychological equity.

This would be

especially likely to occur when the case is such that observers or
participants are unable to restore actual equity.

Additionally, an

observer may respond to a situation by using a combination of both
responses, partially restoring actual equity and sufficiently distorting
reality to establish psychological equity.

Therefore, it appears

that the equity theory accounts for the situations that individuals

utilize a just world perception, that is, when actual equity cannot
be restored.
The approach taken by an individual depends on costs and benefits
perceived to be associated with each strategy.

Equity theory is based

on the assertion that observers can evaluate the fairness of an inter
action more objectively than can participants, to the point that even
the most aloof judges are motivated to right existing wrongs, and if
that fails, to be convinced that this is a just world (Austin, Walster,
& Utne, 1976).

Equity theory predicts that the effect of a defendant's

suffering determines a judge's or juror's liking for him and their,
eagerness to punish.

Suffering by a defendant as a result of a crime

may be regarded as punishment in itself which compensates further pun-,
ishment.

Such was the case for a bank robber who was crippled when

making a getaway and who received an unusually light sentence, and the
mother whose child was killed when she ran a stop sign treated with
similar leniency (Austin, Walster, & Utne, 1976).
Further evidence that demonstrates that jurors take a criminal's
"suffering in the act" into account when deciding on an appropriate
sentence comes from two studies by Austin (1976).

In both studies,

Austin asked college students to read a synopsis of the proceedings
of an actual trial and play the role of the mock jurors, and then
recommend an appropriate sentence.

In the first study, the defendant

snatched a purse,.a relatively minor crime.

In the second study,

the defendant's crime was more serious, not only had he snatched, a
purse but he had severely beat his female victim causing her to be
hospitalized, for a number of days.

In both studies, after allegedly

committing the crime, the defendant attempted to escape from the scene.

In the process of escape, it was claimed that the purse snatcher had
suffered not at all, moderately (i.e., received cuts and bruises), or
excessively (paralyzed from the neck down).

Austin found, in both

studies strong support for the "suffering in the act" notion.

Such

that, the more the defendant was said to have suffered, for both low
severity and high severity crimes, the less extensive the prison
sentence handed down by the mock jurors as being appropriate sentences.
The severity of outcome of an event as a determinant of responsi
bility attribution, a concern of both Walster*s and Lerner*s studies,
is a relationship that Shaver (1970) concluded cannot be reliably
produced.

Shaver has reported two studies, neither of which offered

support for the proposition that responsibility attribution increases
with the severity of outcome.

However, a study by Shaw and Skolnick

(1971) provided evidence that partially supported Walster's view
rather than Lerner's.

That is, a person is more likely to blame a

victim while at the same time regard themself as different from the
victim.

This supposedly protects the observer from a similar fate,

rather than attribute responsibility for a severe accident in order
to preserve a person's belief that the world is just.
Moreover, experiments using accident situations have partially,
demonstrated the observer's desire to find or create a correspondence
between what happens to someone and what he deserves by virtue of his
personal attributes.

According to Lerner's (19&5, 19&6) just world

notion, if something (pleasant or unpleasant) happens to a person,
that person is seen as deserving it for one of two reasons:

(a)

because that person is intrinsically good, (or evil), and. their charac
ter merits the good or bad outcome; or (b) because that person has

behaved in a specific and direct manner to bring out the good or bad
outcome.

Jones and Aronson (1973) tested deservingness in a mock jury

case on rape victims and predicted that if a catastrophe occurs to an
individual, more responsibility is attributed to that victim if the
victim is a respectable person than if he is less respectable.

Speci

fically, Jones and Aronson (1973) found that married and virgin women
were blamed more than divorced women in a rape case by both male and
female subjects.

There was no significant difference between the actual

and the attempted rape conditions for the amount of fault attributed
to the victim.

Their results supported the prediction and suggested

that the more an innocent and respectable victim suffers, the greater
the threat to one's belief in a just world, and the greater the blaming
or attribution of responsibility for the victim.
In summary, differences found for observers' attribution of
responsibility may be due to several factors.

Walster (1966) suggested

severity of consequences serves to increase the responsibility attri
buted to an innocent victim.
the just world notion.

This contention is in agreement with

In addition to severity of outcome, Lerner's

(1965* 1966) just world notion was concerned with victim deservability.
It was suggested that the more innocent the victim is, the more he is
seen as deserving his fate, and the more he is blamed for the consequences
Alternatively, Austin et al. (.1976) contended that suffering in the
act effects observers consideration for responsibility in order to
restore equity, such that punishments were less for those defendants
who suffered as a result of the crime.

A just world perception may

be a contribution factor for restoring psychological equity when actual
equity is not fulfilled.

Jones and Aronson (1973) provided experimental

support for deservability such that, the more respectable the victim
of rape, the more she was regarded as responsible.

Sex of subject as

a variable does not appear to contribute significantly to differences
in attribution of responsibility.
Personality Variables Affecting Attribution of Responsibility
Belief in a just world.refers to a person's desire to view the
world as a just place where people get what they deserve and deserve
what they get.

This construct was used by Lerner et al. (1976) in

order to suggest that those who. see what appears to be unjust suffering
will reduce the sense of injustice by derogation the victim under
certain circumstances.
of two components:

Deservingness, according to Lerner, consists

.personal worth and behavior.

Therefore, observers

of a victim may conclude (a) that the victim is an undesirable person,
or (b) that the victim behaved poorly and brought his suffering
upon themself.
Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975) devised and validated a direct
simple paper-and-pencil measure to assess the degree to which people
would express the belief that they lived in a just world ("Just World
Scale").

They assumed that the belief in. a just world was a relatively

stable and measurable dimension along which people would vary and the
degree of acceptance of this belief should be predictive of people's
reactions in a variety of situations.

For example, in one study (Rubin

& Peplau, 1973), it was found that people who scored, highly on the
JWS were relatively unsympathetic to peers who were less fortunate
than they were in a draft lottery.
Kerr and Kurtz (197?) in a replication of the Jones and Aronson
(1973) study used the Rubin and Peplau (1973) dust World Scale to

assess subject differences.

This scale was used in order to determine

directly whether the Jesuits for attribution of responsibility could
be attributed to. differences in beliefs for a just world, rather than
speculate that the results were due to a just world process by infer
ence.

Kerr and Kurtz (1977) used the length of sentence for the

defendant in addition to attribution of responsibility as dependent
measures.

They found that the defendant was given a longer sentence

when the victim suffered more, as a means of compensation for:the
suffering victim.

This factor was in support of the just world theory.

Results were inconsistent for sex of subject differences, however, it
was found that females thought the victim suffered more than males and
were more likely to give longer sentences to the defendant.
However, other predictions that followed from the theory uniformly
failed (Kerr & Kurtz, 1977).

The respectable and suffering victim was

neither blamed nor devalued more than a victim who was less respectable
or suffered less.

In addition, those who believed most strongly that

the world is just were not more likely to punish the defendant or
blame the victim, and even gave more positive evaluations of the victim
than thosewith a weak belief in the just world.

Kerr and Kurtz (1977)

stated this result does not necessarily disconfirrn the just world
theory if strong.believers generally give more positive evauations of
others.

However, Rubin and Peplau (1975) have not indicated that

there is such a general bias in the research that has employed a just
world scale.
One reason why the results were nonsignificant for the Kerr and
Kurtz (1977) study may be found in a study that was done by Phares
and Wilson (1972).

At times situations can be differentiated on.the
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basis of a structural-ambiguity dimension.

Therefore, this allows

for the possibility that severe outcomes lead to greater responsibility
attribution when situations are highly structured but not when situa
tions are ambiguous remains plausible.

Phares and Wilson (1972)

explored this prediction and suggested that structured situations were
those such that the connection between person: and outcome is very
direct while ambiguous situations were those in which the connection
between person and outcome is not very clear, such that the events are
chance-determined as a function of environmental events over which
those persons involved have no control.
Rubin and Peplau (1973) concluded that the belief in a just world
is not the only determinant of indifference toward victims of society,
rather numerous other individual and cultural factors play important
roles in shaping the tendency to perceive others as deserving their
lots.

It has been demonstrated (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) that high Just

World scores were correlated with a tendency to score in the internal
diredtion on the locus of control scale (r = -.44, p < .001).

This

association is congruent with a just world notion that a belief in a
just world stems from people’s desire to believe that they can control
their own outcomes.
The internal-external locus of control dimension (Rotter, 1966)
is one that has received much attention for‘the assessment of individual
differences (Lefcourt, 1'976; Phares, 1976).

The I-E scale has demon

strated its utility over a wide range of predictive situations that
have provided evidence for its construct validity (Phares, 1976).

Due

to the construct validity and predictability for the locus of control
dimension (Phares, 1976) it is proposed that this dimension is a
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moderator variable for individual differences with regard to responsi
bility attribution.
Phares and Wilson (1972) introduced internal versus external
control of reinforcement (I-E) as a determinant for individual differ
ences of attribution of responsibility.

The I-E dimension refers to

the degree that people regard themselves as responsible for the
occurrence or lack of occurrence of reinforcement (internals) as opposed
to regarding luck, fate, chance, powerful others etc*, (externals) as
being responsible.

Phares and Wilson found that in severe cases internals

attributed more responsibility than externals, when the stimulus situ
ations were ambiguous.

When the stimulus situations were highly

structured there was little in the way of I-E differences.

When severity

of outcomes were low, however, internals did not differ In responsibility
attribution under ambiguous conditions, but under structured conditions
internals attributed greater responsibility than did externals.
Locus of control and attribution of responsibility have been
investigated in other studies.

For example, Phares, Wilson, and

Klyver (19?1) noted that internals attribute less blame for their
failure on tasks to the environment than, do externals.

Furthermore,

in a study involving both success and failure, Davis and Davis (1972.)
demonstrated that internals show a greater tendency to accept
responsibility for their behaviors than do externals.

In addition,

Krovetz (197^-) found that subjects (either internals or externals)
form attributions to account for their successes and failures that
are congruent with the^r locus of control as determined by the I-E
scale.
Phares and Wilson (1972) Indicated that use ofexperimental conditions
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that do not involve quasi-legal judgements, as was the case in the
Phares, et al. (1971) and Davis and Davis (1972) studies, should
produce the predicted interaction between I-E and ambiguous-structured
factors.

They also reasoned that the nonsevere, ambiguous combination

may be so. compelling that both internals and externals are unwilling
to attribute much responsibility.

However, when the outcome becomes

sevorc, they felt thi3 serves to produce individuals* reliance on
their generalized expectency as internals or externals for attribution
of responsibility.
In summary, personality variables that have been forwarded to
account for differences in observers attribution of responsibility
were examined.

The just world scale developed by Rubin and Peplau

(1973) was used in a study by Kerr and Kurtz (1977) that investigated
victim deservingness.

However, Kerr and Kurtz did not obtain results

that conclusively accounted for observer differences as determined by
a belief in a just world for attribution of responsibility.

Another
/

construct, locus of control, was considered as regards to a study by
Phares and Wilson. (1972).

Based on their findings it may be that the

structure of the situations that Kerr and Kurtz (1977) used overrode
individual differences predicted by just world beliefs.

Due to the

construct validity of the locus of control dimension, and the
correlation with.the just world scale, it would seem that the locus
of control dimension may provide a stronger basis for prediction for
observer differences for responsibility attribution.
A comparison of Kerr and Kurtz (1977) just world, study and Phares'
and Wilson's (1972) locus of control study will point out the differ-*
ences in factors examined (see Figure l).

Both studies examined the
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effects of attribution of responsibility, however, individual differences
were just world measures or locus of control measures.

While attribu

tion of responsibility was examined for primarily the plaintiff (rapee)
in the just world study, degree of punishment was also examined for
the defendant.

However, in the locus of control study only responsi

bility attribution was considered for the defendant, while any
contributions by plaintiff for the outcome were ignored.

The present;

study investigated underlying processes for attribution of responsibility
to the plaintiff using a locus of control I-E subject variable.
It will be noted, that both studies considered severity of out
come (high and low) to. have an effect on responsibility attribution.
Deservingness for victim suffering was manipulated in the just world
study by varying the victim's respectability.
characteristics were ignored.

However, defendant

There was no manipulation for deserving

ness of victims's fate in the locus of control study, only attribution
of responslbility measures were considered, for the defendant.
Phares and Wilson (1972) have suggested that situation character
istics are an important factor for responsibility attribution.

There

fore, the locus of control study manipulated, this variable (high and
low) such that, structured and ambiguous cases were examined.
Structured situations meant that judges felt that it was clear that
the defendant was substantially at fault.

Ambiguous meant that from

the accident description it was not clear that the defendant was
substantially at fault or that accompanying conditions were such as
to significantly reduce his guilt.

The just world study by using

rape cases, considered only structured cases such that guilt was
clear for the defendant.
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Another differences between the studies that is determined largely
by the structured-ambiguity dimension is the extent the consequences
were due to chance.

The just world study provided a condition in which

there was little chance saliency due to the nature of the crime, such
that in addition to the high association of guilt for the defendant,
there was a motivational- factor initiating the crime.

Taken together,

these factors seem to override any characteristics of the victim which
may account for failures to replicate the Jones and Aronson (1973)
findings by subsequent studies.
The locus of control study, on the other hand, provided conditions
which varied, the structured-ambiguity dimension.

For all conditions,

however, there was. high chance saliency for the nature of the consequences,
and presumably no motivation on the part of the defendant to initiate
an automobile, accident.
Statement of the Problem
It was the purpose of this study to examine the effect deserving
ness has for attribution of responsibility as predicted by.the just
world theory.

However, rather than using the just world scale, locus

of control (I-E) was the measure of individual differences, for the
judges.

Generalized expectancies for a person's locus of control have

been shown to depend on the assertion that internally oriented people
not only see themselves as responsible for events, but will also see
others as responsible for their own outcomes (Phares & Wilson, 1972).
Conversely, externals may tend to attribute less responsibility to
others just as they do to themselves.

Due to the construct validity

and predictability for the locus of control scale (Phares, 1976;
Lefcourt, 1976), it was predicted that this dimension would demonstrate

individual differences as regards to attribution of responsibility for
differences for victim deservingness.
Based on the results of the Phares and Wilson (1972) study, it
appears that only locus of control differences will be produced by
ambiguous situations that have severe consequences.
present study used only ambiguous situations.

Therefore, this

It was the contention

of this study that the structural-ambiguity dimension accounted for
contradictions found for previous studies that dealt with attribution
of responsibility in a just world framework (e.g., Jones & Aronson,
1973; Kerr & Kurtz, 1977).

Furthermore, it is suggested that attribution

of responsibility did not occur in the manner predicted by the just
world theory because of the high situation structure for rape cases.
Due to the descriptions of the cases by Kerr and Kurtz such that guilt
was clear for the defendant when the crime was completed, it would
seem easier to blame the defendant rather than attribute responsibility
X

to the victim regardless of deservingness.

This would seem especially

true since the victim was described in a typical situation which could
be assumed to occur regularly, that i s , walking to her parked car after
an evening class at a university.

Therefore, a victim following a

routine that has little to do with chance, is a structured situation.
Additionally, it is a situation that obviously would have little to do
with the respectability dimension such as married, virgin, or divorced
victims used by Jones and Aronson (1973) ancI

the replication by

Kerr and Kurtz (1977).
In addition to deservingness and locus of control, outcome
severity was examined., since it has been demonstrated that responsibility
attribution increases with outcome severity (Walster, 1966; Phares &
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Wilson, 1972).
In summary, the objectives for this study were to test (a) the
effect of plaintiff's deservingness to suffer, (b) severity of outcome
to the plaintiff, and (c) observer's locus of control on attribution
of responsibility in ambiguous situations.
Hypotheses
In summary, the following predictions were tested:

(1) main

effect for deservingness, such that, the more respectable the plaintiff,
manipulated by deservingness of the plaintiff to suffer (a) the more
responsibility attributed to the defendant; and (b) the greater the
sentence recommendations for the defendant; and (c) the less responsible
the plaintiff will be judged.
(2) Main effect for severity, such that, the more severe the
accident, (a) the more responsibility attributed to the defendant; and
(b) the greater the sentence recommendations for the defendant; and
(c) the more responsible the plaintiff will be judged.
(3) No interaction between deservingness main effect and severity
main effect was predicted.
(4) Main effects should be strongest for those who have an internal
locus of control orientation.

That is, this study proposed to inves

tigate the effects on attribution of responsibility for two levels of
I-E (internals and externals), two levels of severity of outcome (high
and low), two levels of defendant deservingness (high and low), and
nine different dependent measures (for defendant:

statement of respon

sibility, imposition of fines, license suspension or jail, and driver
re-education; for plaintiff:

statement of responsibility, judgement

for medical expenses, judgement for coverage of car repairs, extent
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of pain and suffering retributions, and judgement for outcome
severity).
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CHAPTER II.
METHOD

Subjects
The subjects were 100 male and female undergraduate psychology
students at UNO who received extra course credit for their partici
pation.

Subjects were administered the locus of control test and

stimulus materials at the same time.

Scores on the locus of control

scale ranged from 2 to 1_2 with a median of 12.

Internal subjects

were defined as those with scores below 1_2, while-external subjects
were defined as those with scores above 12.
Desi gn

A 2(I-E) x-2(Severit.y).x 2(Deservingness) mixed design (1 between
and 2 within factors) was employed.

All subjects were presented with

four accident summaries adapted from the Phares and Wilson (1972)
study (see Appendix B).
Both internal and external subjects received four combinations
of severity and deservingness scenarios.

There were four scenarios,

each having four versions for severity and deservingness.

Therefore,

each subject received one version of each of the four scenarios in
order to be presented, with all possible combinations of severity and
deservengness.

There were, therefore, 16 setting produced.

A random

assignment of settings comprised the four stimuli that subjects received.
Independent Variables
The principal independent measures were two levels of plaintiff
deservingness to suffer (high and low), severity of consequences
for the plaintiffs (high and low), and locus of control (internal
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and external).

In general, plaintiffs deservingness referred to

plaintiffs contributions to the accident in such a manner as.to
have potentially avoided or not to have avoided the accident.
Severity of outcome referred to the extent of bodily injury and/
or property damage to the plaintiff.
the last factor (locus of control).

A median split was performed on
All accident summaries were

ambiguous such that from the accident description it was not clear
that the defendant was substantially at fault or that accompanying
conditions were such as to significantly reduce the guilt (see
.Appendix 3).
Dependent Variables
The principal dependent measures were seven-point unipolar scales
for two categories, on© for the defendant, the other for the plaintiff.
The measures for the defendant were:

(a) judgement of defendant's

responsibility for the accident, (b) imposition -of fines, (c) license
suspensions or jail, and (d) driver re-education.
The measures for the plaintiff were:

(a) judgement of plaintiff's

responsibility, (b) judgement for payment of medical expenses, (c)
judgement for;-payment of car damage expenses, and (d) extent of pain
and suffering retributions.
The manipulation checks consisted of seven-point unipolar scales
that assessed each subject's perception for each of the four scenarios
as regards severity of the accident for the plaintiff, and deserving
ness for the plaintiff to suffer.
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Procedure
Subjects were administered the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter,
1966; see Appendix A) and the stimulus materials, accident summaries
simultaneously.

The size of experimental groups varied with number

of subjects who arrived as scheduled for experimental sessions ranging
from 2_ to jL6 subjects.
Each subject received a stimulus booklet for which conditions
had been counter-balanced and randomly assigned.

Each booklet contained

the following instructions:
This is a study which deals with the American jury
system.

We have taken a series of brief legal summaries

of court cases which were printed in the Midwest Auto Digest
and assembled them into booklets.

We would like you to

read these summaries and then make certain judgements.
The purpose of this research is to determine how closely
your judgements correspond to the actual judgements and
verdicts of the real juries.

In this way, we may be able

to learn something about the manner in which information
should be presented to juries so that they can better pro
cess it and reach valid conclusions.

Ultimately, it may

then be possible to move toward computerization of some of
these processes and modes of information presentation.
The following are approximations of actual court cases,
tried in various Superior Courts..
the defendants for damages.

The plaintiffs were suing

Damages here means money above

the costs of any property damage or medical expenses, i.e.,
beyond auto repairs or hospital costs.

You are to examine

the evidence and rate the cases on the scales provided.
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As in. an actual court of law, the insurance coverage, or lack
of it should not be a factor in determining guilt, and will
not therefore, be specified.
comparing

As we said before, we are

your ratings with the actual jury responses.

There followed four brief case descriptions for each subject,
the following two were typical:
Defendant:

Harrison

Plaintiff:

Norwick

Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be
following a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay.
Suddenly, a bale of hay fell from the truck and landed on
the road several car lengths in front of Harrison9s car
causing him to lose control.

Harrison1s car crossed, the

center line and side-swiped Norwick.
very minor cuts and bruises.
slightly.

Norwick received

His car was damaged but only

The truck disappeared and was not identified.

Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck
too closely--otherwise he could have avoided the hay and
prevented the accident.

In short, Harrison was not alert

and not a particularly intelligent driver.
Police investigation revealed that Norwick had been
drinking.

However, the recorded alcohol level in a breath

analysis was just below the legal intoxication limit.
Harrison claims on the other hand, that.no one expects
to have a bale of hay fall off a truck like that and,' there
fore, he should not be held accountable,

He also claims

that.he was following a .reasonable distance.

The police

report indicated that there was no trace of alcohol for

23
Harrison according to a breath analysis.
Defendant:

McGee

Plaintiff:

Bell

McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights
of the car preceding Bell through the turn.

McGee's speed

could not be assessed since there were no skid marks.

How

ever, a pedestrian believes McGee's speed was not excessive.
The collision occured at 11:M0 PM.

The weather was clear

and no mechanical impairments were observed on McGee's car.
Bell received fractures and internal bleeding and also
sustained extensive damage to his car.
ally incapacitated for work.

He was still parti

Medical testimony indicated

that there was no trace of alcohol in a blood sample from
Bell.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too
fast or did not know how to handle a car properly after
dark.

But in either case,, he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by

the lights of an oncoming car,and therefore his responsibi
lity reduced.

Police investigation determined McGee had not

been drinking prior to the accident.
This particular Harrison versus Norwick version represented a
nonsevere situation such that deservingness is low for the defendant.
The example version for McGee versus Bell case represented a situation
such that deservingness is high for the defendant and the outcome is
severe.

Of the 16 scenarios, four were presented to each subject (one

version for each of four cases) so that each subject received all
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combinations.

Of the four presented, one was high deservingness-

severe, one low deservingness-severe, one high deservingness-nonsevere, and one low deservingness-nonsevere.
After each case description, subjects were asked to make ratings
for the defendant and plaintiff.

.The ratings consisted of seven-point

bipolar scales.. The first rating for the defendant consisted of the
regard for defendants' responsibility for the accident.

The other

defendant ratings were each within maximum-minumum sentence allocations
and included jail and/or license suspension, driver re-education, and
fine.

The ratings for the plaintiff were also seven-point bipolar

scales, that asked for subjects judgements for plaintiffs responsibi
lity for the accident, to what extent the plaintiff account for his
own medical expenses and car damages, and the extent of the severity
of the accident.

There also was one open-ended question that requested

an evaluation of the dollar amount to be indicated for pain and
suffering experienced by the plaintiff.

These scales appear in

Appendix C.
Upon completion of-'the stimulus materials and rating scales,
subjects were debriefed and dismissed.

Subjects' participation credit

cards were signed by the experimenter and returned at this time.

25
CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Malnipulatlon Checks
The results of univariate analyses of variance revealed successful
manipulations of subjects* perceptions for both plaintiffs deserving
ness and severity of accidental consequences treatments.

Subjects

perceived those plaintiffs who had been drinking, though not legally
intoxicated, as more deserving to suffer the responsibility for the
accident (M - 2.80) than those who had not been drinking (M = 1.82),
F (1,98) = 72.01, £ «£ .001.

Likewise, subjects regarded the accident

more severe when plaintiffs incurred major injuries and extensive
automobile damages (M = 5*0?) than those who received minor cuts,
bruises and slight automobile damages (M = 2.51), F (1,98) = 573.09,

£ < .001.
Attribution of Responsibility
Multivariate Analysis of Variance.

Separate thre-way (Locus of

Control x Severity x Deservingness) multivariate analyses of variance
were performed on the variables that pertained to the defendant:
responsibility, sentence, driver re-education, and fine; and the vari
ables that pertained to the plaintiff:

responsibility, medical expenses,

automobile expenses, and pain and suffering retributions.

Defendants

produced a significant main effect for outcome severity, F (3,92) =
11.17, £ <

.001.

In addition, plaintiffs produced a significant main

effect for locus of control, F (3,92) = 5.84, £ < .05; severity,
F (3,92) = 8.17, £

,01; and deservingness, F (3,92) = 18.68, £<. .001.

26
Univariate Analyses of Variance.

Separate three-way analyses, of

variance were performed for each of the eight dependent variables
that pertained to defendants and plaintiffs.

These analyses revealed

that subjects allocated more responsibility to defendants for high
severity consequences (fi = .4.02) than for defendants in low severity
conditions (M = 3.49), F (1,98) = 12.94, £ <C .001; gave harsher license
suspensions to defendants for severe consequences (M'= 1.62) than for
defendants in nonsevere conditions (M =1,30), F (1,98) = 34,4?,
£ < .001; gave a more.extensive driver re-education program to defen
dants when consequences were severe (M = 3-21) than when consequences
were nonsevere (M = 2 .65), F (1,98) = 17.81, £

.001; and gave a higher

monetary fine to defendants for high severity consequences (M = 2.60)
than for defendants in low severity consequences (M = 1.90), F (1,98)
= 34.00, £ < .001.
Subjects were found to differ for their responsibility derogated
to plaintiffs based upon locus of control orientations.

Subjects

with an external locus of control attributed more fault to plaintiffs
(M = 2.47) than subjects with an internal orientation (M = 2.15),
F (1,98) = 4.05, £ < .05.

A significant interaction was found for

locus of control versus severity of consequences, F (1,98) = 4.00,
£ < .01.

Further analysis revealed that subjects with an internal

orientation gave a stiffer fine (M =: 2.78) to the defendant than
subjects with an external orientation (M = 2.42), F (1,98) = 1.66,
£ <

.08.

This was determined to occur only for situations with highly

severe consequences.
Additional findings indicated that subjects held plaintiffs less
accountable for medical expenses when the accident was not severe
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(M - 1.90) than when the accident was severe (M = 2.25), F (1,98) =
4.30, £ < .0 5 ; and when sober (M - 1.82) than when they had been
drinking (M = 2.34), F (1,98) =11.34, £ ^

.001.

Likewise, plaintiffs

were held less accountable for car damages when sober (li = 2.15) than
when Intoxicated (M .= 2.4?), F (1,98). = 3.49, £ <

.10.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

In general, the data did not support the contention that the
more respectable the plaintiff as determined by deservingness of the
plaintiff to suffer, the more the defendant would be regarded as res
ponsible and therefore receive harsher sentence recommendations,
while the plaintiff held less responsible.

Evidently, observers do

not make judgements for the defendant's and plaintiff's responsibility
in conjunction as regards to plaintiff's deservingness to suffer.
Rather, observers considered the plaintiffs deservingness to suffer
only for the plaintiff when judging the amount of responsibility
assigned to the plaintiff and the extent plaintiffs were accountable
for their own damages.

If one can assume the plaintiffs deservingness

to suffer as analogous with Jones' and Aronson's (1973) respectablenonrespectable va.riable for victim deservingness, then their results
were not replicated.

This is because plaintiff deservingness did not

affect observers assignment of responsibility to the defendant.
On the other hand, the data supported the contention that the more
severe the accident consequences for the plaintiff, the more responsible
the defendant was judged, and the more extensive the sentence recommen
dations.

This finding is in accordance with Walster's (1966) prediction

that the responsibility one assigns increases as the magnitude of con
sequences increases.

However, the severity of consequences did not

have an affect on the observers assignment of responsibility to the
plaintiff.

As was predicted, no interaction was found between deser

vingness and severity main effects.

The data did not support the prediction that the main effect for
deservingness would be strongest for those observers who have an inter
nal locus of control orientation.

However, the data did support the

prediction that internals would judge the defendant as more responsible
when accident consequences were severe due to the harsher fine recom
mendations given by internals.

Therefore, in part, the result were

found to support Phares* and Wilson's (1972) findings fo.r locus of
control dimension as a determinant for individual differences of
attribution of responsibility.

This is because they had found that

severe cases produced an internal-external effect such that internals
derogated defendants more than externals when stimulus situations were
ambiguous rather than structured.

In addition the results of this

present study indicated that observers' locus of control orientation
affected the degree of fault assigned to plaintiffs.

Externals

assigned more fault to the plaintiffs than internals.
The derogation of a highly respectable victim appears to be evident
in cases where the victim is clearly innocent, as was the finding for
a typical rape case (Jones & Aronson, 1973) such that the guilt of the
defendant is highly unambiguous.

However, when the guilt of the defen

dant is ambiguous, then it is very likely that the highly respectable
plaintiff will not be derogated, as was the finding of this present
study.

Phares and Wilson (1972) did not examine perceived deserving-

ness for the victim to suffer nor the affect that victim deservingness
has for defendant blame and punishment.
Another explanation for why the respectable plaintiff was not
regarded as deservingness the outcomes and derogated with more respon
sibility may be due to the manner jurors formulate their perceptions
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of the accident.

In order to determine a person's estimate of victim

deservingness, people use several considerations such as the contri
butions made by those involved in a situation, their needs as a result
of the situation, and consideration for equal treatment (Leventhal,
1976).

Furthermore, a person uses separate computational routes to

estimate the victim's deservingness, and then combines these estimates
in order to arrive'at an overall judgement of deservingness.

Generally,

people judge those involved in a situation fairly by giving them out
comes they deserve, but sometimes may be unable to change their actual
outcomes.

In such cases, according to Leventhal (1976), people may

change their perceptions of the victim's behavior, for example, by
derogation them.

Since the jurors in this present study were able to

alter the outcomes for the plaintiff to some extent, that is, allow
for greater compensation, there was no need to derogate the highly
respectable plaintiff.
Therefore, it seems that the reason the present results occured
may best be explained in terms of equity theory (eg., Austin, Walster,
& Utne, I976, Leventhal, 1976)

That is to say, jurors applied equity

principles for consideration of mitigating circumstances ("inputs)
for determing rewards and handing down sentences (outcomes).
Qualitatively, an equitable relation can be determined from the
following basic equation:
(Adams, I965).

outcomesA - inputsA = outcomesB - inputsB
inputsa
inputsB

Applying this equation to the findings obtained from

this study,, one finds that equitable relations result.

This is because,

those plaintiffs regarded as less than respectable had outcomes
significantly reduced for reparations due to the input of having been
drinking.

This balances with the regard for the defendant who was
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considered to have little or no responsibility for the accident (input),
therefore little punishment (outcome) was suggested by the jurors.
In summary, the less respectable plaintiff was perceived as more
deservingness to suffer responsibility for the consequences, and
observers decreased the blame and punishment for the defendant.

In

addition, plaintiffs were compensated less when they were regarded as
more deserving to suffer responsibility for the accident than those
not deserving to suffer.
On the other hand, severe accident consequences were viewed as
inputs for the defendant such that harsher punishments were suggested
by the jurors (outcomes).

In order to restore equity to the plaintiff

for the severe consequences, plaintiffs were regarded as less deserving
to suffer (input), which was most notable for non-drinking plaintiffs,
and greater reparations (outcomes) were suggested by the jurors.
It appears therefore, that jurors take into consideration moral
and ethical aspects for plaintiffs in awarding direct compensation to
them, but have less regard for such factors when they pertain directly
to defendant sentencing.

In other words, jurors allocate rewards and

punishments to plaintiffs and defendants based upon the perceived
deservingness of each in order to restore equity to those involved.
Plaintiffs deservingness to be rewarded and compensated is a function
of their perceived moral and legal innocence, while the severity of
consequences determines defendants deservingness to be punished.
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SOCIAL REACTION INVENTORY
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain-,
important events in our society affect different people. Each item
consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the
one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly
believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select
the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you
think you should choose or the one you would like to be true. This
is a measure of personal belief, obviously there are no right or
wrong answers.
Your answer, either a or b to each question on this inventory,
is to be reported on the answer sheet. Print your name and any
other information requested by the examinar on the answer sheet, then
finish reading these directions. Do not begin until you are told to
do so.
Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much
time on any one item. Be'sure to find an answer for every choice.
For each numbered question make an X on the line beside either the
a^ or b, whichever you choose as the statement most true.
In some instances you may discover that you believe both state
ments or neither one.
In such cases, be sure to select the one you
more strongly believe to be the case as far a you.’re concerned. Also
try to respond to each item independently when making your choice; do
not be influenced by your previous choices.
REMEMBER
Select that alternative which you personally believe to be more true.
I more strongly believe that:
1.

a.

Children get into trouble because their parents punish them
too much
b-. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents
are too easy with them.

2.

a.

3.

a.

Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due
to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

b.

l4-.

a.
b.

One of the major reasons why we have wars is because
don't take enough interest in politics,
There will always be wars, no matter how hard people
prevent them.

people
try;to

In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this
world.
Unfortunately, and individual's worth often passes unrecognized
no matter how hard he tries.
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5.

a.
b.

The idea that teachers are unfair to students in nonsense,
Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades
are influenced by accidental happenings.

6.

a.
b.

Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader,
Capable people who fail to become leaders have.not taken
advantage of their opportunities.

7.

a.
b.

No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you,
People who can't get others to like them don't understand
how to get along with others.

8.

a.
b.

Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality,
It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're
like.

9.

a.
b.

I have often found that what is going to happen will happen,
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as
making a decision to take a definite course of action.

10.. a.
b.

11.

a.
b.

In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if
ever such a thing as an unfair test,
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course
work that studying is really useless.
Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little
or nothing to do with it.
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place
at the ri ght time.

12.

a.
b.

The average citizen can have an influence in goverment decisions,
This world is run by the few people in power, and there is
not much the little guy can do about it.

13.

a,.

When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them.
work.
It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. .

b.

lh.

a.
b.

' There are certain people who are just no good,
There is some good in everybody.

15.

a.

Jn my case getting, what I want has little or nothing to do
with luck.
Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping
a coin.

b.

16.

a.
b.

Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough
to be in the right place first,
Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability,
luck has little or nothing to do with it.

40
17.

a.
b.

18.

a.

As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the
victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control,
By taking an active part in political and social affairs the
people can control world events.

b.

Most people can't realize the extent to which their lives are
controlled by accidental happenings,
There really is no such'thing as "luck".

19.

a.
b.

One should always be willing to admit his mistakes,
It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20.

a.
b.

It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person
you are.

21.

a.

In the long run the bad things that happen, to us are balanced
by the good ones,
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance,
laziness, or all three.

V

b.

22.

a.
b.

23.

a.

With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption,
It is difficult for people to have much control over the
things politicians do in office.

Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the
grades they give,
b. There is a direct connection between how hard. I study and the
grades I get.

24. a,

A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what
they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25. a.
b.

Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things
that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays
an important role in my life.

26.

a.
b.

People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if
they like you, they like you.

27.

a.
b.

There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
Team sports are an excellent way to build character.

28.

a.
b.

What happens to me is my own doing.
Sometimes I feel that 1 don't have enough control over the
direction my life is taking.

29.

a.

Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave
the way they d o .
In the long run the people are responsible for bad goverment
on a national as well as on a local level.

b.
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APPENDIX B
Stimulus Materials
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Defendant:

Harrison.

Plaintiff:

Norwick

Harrison was driving home from work and' happened to be following
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay.

Suddenly, a bale of

hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths
in front of Harrison’s car causing him to lose control,
car crossed the center line and side-swiped Norwick.
very minor cuts and bruises.

Harrison’s

Norwick received

His car was damaged but only slightly.

The truck disappeared and was not identified.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the accident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent
driver.
Harrison claims on the other hand, that no one expects to have
a bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should
not be held accountable.

He also claims that he was following a

reasonable distance.
The police report indicated that neither Harrison or Norwick
had been drinking alcohol according to the results of a breath
analysi s .
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Defendant:

Harrison

Plaintiff:

Horwick

Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be following
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay.

Suddenly, a bale of

hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths in
front of Harrison’s car causing him to lose control.
crossed the center line and side-swiped llorwick.
very minor cuts and bruises.

Harrison’s car

Worwick received

His car was damaged but only slightly.

The truck disappeared and. was not identified.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the accident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent
driver.
Police investigation revealed that horwick had been drinking.
However, the recorded alcohol level in a breath analysis was just
below the legal intoxication limit.
Harrison Claims on the other hand, that no one expects to have
a bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should not
be.held accountable.
distance.

He also claims that he was following a reasonable

The police report indicated that there was no trace of

alcohol according to a breath analysis for Harrison.
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Defendant:

Harrison

Plaintiff:

Norwick

Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be following
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay.

Suddenly, a bale of

hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths in
front of Harrison’s car causing him to lose control,
crossed the center line and side-swiped Norwick.
received extensive damage.
fied.

Harrison’s car

Norwick’s car

The truck disappeared and was not identi

Medical testimony established that Norwick received numerous

multiple fractures, severe internal bleeding and. was not able to
resume work for a considerable period of time (8 months after the
accident).

According to a blood sample, there was no trace of

alcohol for Norwick.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the acident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent
driver.
Harrison claims on the other hand that no one expects to have a
bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should not
be held accountable.
distance.

He also claims that he was following a reasonable

The police report indicated that there was no trace of

alcohol according to a breath analysis for Harrison.
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Defendant:

Harrison

Plaintiff:

Norwick

Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be following
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay.

Suddenly, a bale of

hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths in
front of Harrison’s car causing him to. lose control.
crossed the center line and side-swiped Norwick.
received extensive damage.
tified.

Harrison’s, car

Norwick’s car

The truck disappeared and was not iden

Medical testimony established that Norwick had received

numerous fractures, severe internal bleeding and was not able to
resume work for a considerable period to time (8 months after the
accident).
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the accident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent
driver.
Medical testimony revealed that Norwick had been drinking prior
to the accident.

However, the recorded alcohol level in a blood sam

ple was just below the legal intoxication level.
Harrison claims on the otherhand, that no one expects to have a
bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should not
be held accountable.
distance.

He also claims that he was’following a reasonable

The police report indicated that there was no trace of

alcohol according to a breath analysis for Harrison.
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Defendant:

Doe

Plaintiff:

Rack

Doe claimed the accident (sides/wiping of Rack’s car) was not his
fault.

Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front of

Rack’s auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid striking a child
that stepped into the street.

Doe's claim concerning the child was

corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity.

The

weather was clear and neither party was exceeding the speed limit.
Rack received minor abrasions and damage to his car was not extensive.
Neither Doe or Rack was reported to have been drinking alcohol
according to the police report.
Rack claims that although fn all probability the child did step
in front of Doe’s car, he should have been more alert.

After all,

Rack claims, it was 4:00 PM (just when local schools let out) and signs
clearly indicated that drivers should beware of children.
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Defendant:

Doe

Plaintiff:

Rack

Doe claimed the accident (sideswiping of Rack's car).was not his
fault.

Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front of

Rack's auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid striking a child
that stepped into the street.

Doe's claim concerning the child was

corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity.

The

weather was clear and neither party was exceeding the speed limit.
Rack received minor abrasions and damage to his car was not extensive.
The results of a breath analysis revealed that Rack had been drinking,
however, the alcohol level was just below that of the legal intoxica
tion limit.

The police indicated that Doe had not been drinking

alcohol.
Rack.claims that in all probability the child did step in front
of Doe's car, he should have been more alert.

After .all, Rack claims,

it was 4:00 PM (just when local schools let out) and signs clearly
indicated that drivers should beware of children.

Defendant:

Doe

Plaintiff:

Rack

Doe claimed the accident (sideswiping of Rack's car) was. not his
fault.

Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front

of Rack's auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid, striking a
child that stepped into the street.

Doe's claim concerning the child

was corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity.
The weathe-r was clear and neiter party was exceeding the speed limit.
Rack received a whiplash and several fractures, and was incapacitated
for work (5 months after the accident).
considerable.

Damage to Rack's car was

Neither Doe or Rack was reported to have been drinking

alcohol according to the police report.
Rack claims that in all probability the child did step in front
of Doe's car, he should have been more alert.

After all, Rack claims,

it was 4:00 EM (just when local schools let out) and signs clearly
indicated that drivers should beware of children.

D e f e n d ant:

Doe

Plaintiff:

Rack

Doe claimed the accident (sideswiping of Rack's car) was not his
fault.

Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front

of Rack's auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid striking a child
that stepped into the street.

Doe's claim concerning the child was

corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity.
The weather was clear and neither party was exceeding the speed limit.
Rack received a whiplash and several fractures, and he was incapacita
ted for work (5 months after the accident).

Damage to Rack's car

was considerable.
The results of a blood sample revealed that Rack had been
drinking, however, the alcohol level was just below the legal intoxi
cation limit.

The police report based on a breath analysis, indicated

no trace of alcohol for Doe.
Rack claims that in all probability the child did step in.front
of Doe.'s car, he should have been more alert.

After all, Rack claims,

it was 4:00 EM (just when local schools let out) and signs clearly
indicated that drivers should beware of children.

Defendant:

McGee

Plaintiff:

Bell

McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights of the
car preceding Bell through the turn.

McGee's speed could not be

assessed since there were no skid marks.
McGee's speed was not excessive.

However, a pedestrian believes

The collision occured at 11:40 PM.

The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were observed, on
*

McGee's car.

Bell received minor abrasions and damage to his auto was

only slight.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark.

But in either

case he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights
of an oncoming car and, therefore, his responsibility was reduced.
Police reports indicated that neither Bell or McGee had been
drinking alcohol based on the results of breath analyses.
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Defendant:

McGee

Plaintiff:

Bell

McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights of the
car preceding Bell through the turn.

McGee's speed could not be

assessed since there were no skid marks.
believes McGee's speed was hot excessive.
ll-:40 PM.

However, a pedestrian
The collision occured at

The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were

observed on McGee's car.
his auto was only slight.

Bell received minor abrasions and damage to
Police testimony stated Bell had been

drinking, however, the alcohol level according to a breath analysis
was just below the legal intoxication limit.
Bell's lawyer states

that either McGee was driving too fast or

did not know how to handle a car properly after dark.

But in either

case, he was not at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights
of an oncoming car and, therefore, his responsibility was reduced.
Police investigation determined McGee had not been drinking alcohol
prior to the accident.
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Defendant:

McGee

Plaintiff:

Bell

McGee claims he was temporarily blinded, by the headlights of the
car preceding Bell through the turn.

McGee's speed could not be

assessed since there were no skid marks.
McGee's speed was not excessive.

However, a pedestrian believes

The collision occured at 11:40 PM.

The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were observed on
McGee's car.
Bell received fractures and internal bleeding and also sustained
extensive damage to his caP.
for work.

He was still partially incapacitated

Medical testimony indicated that there was no trace of

alcohol in a blood sample from Bell.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark.

But in either

case, he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights
of an oncoming car and, therefore his responsibility reduced.

Police

investigation determined McGee had not been drinking alcohol prior
to the accident.
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Defendant:

McGee

Plaintiff:

Bell

McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights of the
car preceding Bell through the turn.

McGee's speed could not be

assessed since there were no skid marks.
McGee's speed was not excessive.

However, a pedestrian believes

The collision occured. at 11:40. PM.

The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were observed on
McGee's car.
Bell received fractures and internal bleeding and also sustained
extensive damage to his car.

He was still partially incapacitated for

work.. Medical testimony indicated that the alcohol level in a blood
sample was just below the legal intoxication limit for Bell.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark.

But in either

case, he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights
of an oncoming car and, therefore his responsibility reduced.

Police

investigation determined that McGee had not been drinking alcohol
prior to the accident.
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Defendant:

Mills

Plaintiff:

Denning

Denning was trabeling west.

Mills was traveling east.

a small but deep pothole created.by recent rains.
difficult to see when drining east.

Mills hit

The pothole was very

Striking the pothole caused

Mill£.V tie-rod (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the
car) to break.

Mills' car .went out of control, crossed the center line

and side-swiped Denning's vehicle causing only moderate damage.
Witnesses said both parties were well within the speedlimit.

Denning

suffered minor cuts and bruises.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert, for bad
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he should
have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had a steering
breakdown.
Police investigation revealed that neither Mills or Denning had
been drinking alcohol based upon breath analyses.
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Defendant:

Mills

Plaintiff:

Denning

Denning was traveling west.

Mills was traveling east.

a small but deep pothole created by recent rains.
difficult to see when drining east.

Mills hit

The pothole was very

Striking the pothole caused Mill^i

tie-rod (part of the assemble controlling the steering of the car) to
break.

Mills' car went out of control, crossed the center line and

'side-swiped Denning's vehicle causing only moderate damage.

Witnesses

said both parties were well within the speed limit.
Denning suffered minor cuts and bruises.
report, Denning had been drinking.

According to the police

However, the breath analysis

determined that his alcohol level was just below the legal intoxication
limit.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control.

The

police report indicated that Mills had. no trace of alcohol in. his
system according to a breath analysis.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he
should have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had
a steering breakdown.

56
Defendant:

M^lls

Plaintiff:

Denning

Denning was traveling west.

Mills was traveling east.

a small hut deep pothole created by recent rains.
very difficuot to see when driving east.

Mill's hit

The pothole was

Striking the pothole caused

Mills' tie-rod. (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the
car) to break.

Mills' car went out of control, crossed the center'line

and struck Denning's vehicle head-on (causing severe damage to Denning's
car).

Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed limit.
Denning suffered severe internal bleeding and 3 badly broken bones

as a result of the collision.
(11 months after the accident).

He was still not able to work.full-time
Medical testimony indicated that

there was no trace of alcohol in a blood sample.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control.

A

police report revealed that Mills had not been drinking alcohol.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad.
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he
should have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had
a steering breakdown.
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Defendant:.

Mills

Plaintiff:

Denning

Denning was traveling west.

Mills was traveling east.

a small but deep pothole created by recent rains.
very difficult to see when driving east.

Mills hit

The pothole Was

Striking the pothole caused

Mills' tie-rod (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the
car) to break.

Mills' car went out of control, crossed the center line

and struck Denning's vehicle head-on (causing severe damage to Denning's
car).

Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed limit.
Denning suffered severe internal bleeding and 3 badly broken

bones as a result of the collision.

He was still not able to work

full-time (11 months after the accident).

Medical testimony indicated

that there was no trace of alcohol in a blood sample.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control.

A

police report revealed that Mills had not been drinking alcohol.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he
should have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had a .
steering breakdown.
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Defendant:

Mills .

Plaintiff:

Denning

Denning was traveling west.

Mills was traveling east.

a small but deep pothole created by recent rains.
difficult to see when driving east.

Mills hit

The pothole was very

Striking the pothole caused Mills'

tie-rod' (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the car) to
break.

'ills' car went out of control, crossed the center lane and

struck Denning's vehicle head-on (causing severe damage to Denning's
car).

Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed, limit.
Denning suffered severe internal bleeding and 3 badly broken

bones as a. result of the collision.

He was still not able to work

full-time (11 months after the accident)..

Medical testimony revealed

that the alcohol level in a blood sample was just below the legal
intoxication limit.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control.

The

.'police report indicated that Mills had no trace of alcohol in his
system according to a breath analysis.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he should
have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had a steering
break-down.

APPENDIX C
Responsibility

Attribution Scales
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I.

Please rate your feelings about the defendant's responsibility for
the accident.

That i s , the degree to which the accident was his

fault.
Circle one.
Not at all
responsible
I personally feel he was:
0
1
II.

Remember.

Moderately ,
responsible
2
3

The following court sentences should be considered in

addition to any costs of repairs or medical expenses.
recommend that, the judge impose upon the defendant, the
sentence.
A.

Very
responsible
'5
6

I would
following

Place a check next to one alternative under A, B, and C.

_____ 1. Nothing
__ 2.

Suspend his driver's license for one month

3* Suspend his driver's license for three months
J

h. Suspend his driver's license for six months

_____ 5* Suspend his driver's license.for six months and sentence
him to one weekend in jail
6.

Suspend his driver's license and sentence him to three
weekends in jail

_____ 7 .

Revoke his driver's license completely and sentence him
to one full month in jail

B.

_____ 1. Nothing
_____ 2. Recommend that he study the driving manual
3* Require that he re-read and pass a test on the
driving manual
________ h.

Require that he re-read and pass a test on the driving
manual and also take the driving test again

61

5.

Require that he spend three sessions in a driver
training course and pass the driving test again

6.

Require that he spend nine sessions in a driver

. training course
7. Require that

andpass

he spend

15 sessions

training course andpass
C.

thedriving

toct again

in a driver

thedriving

test again

Fine of:
_____ 1. Nothing
2 . $1 - 50
3 . $51 - 100
h.

$101 - 250

_____ 5. $251 - 500
6 . $501 - 1,000
_____ 7 . over $1,000
III.

Please rate your feelings about the plaintiff’s responsibility for
the accident.

That is, the degree to shich the accident was his
t

fault.
Circle one.
Not at all
responsible
I personally feel he was:
0
1
IV.

Moderately
responsible
2
3

Very
responsible
h
5
6

In addition to the sentences recommended for the defendant, I
would, suggest that the plaintiff be accountable for the following
expenses.

Place a check next to one alternative under A, and d,

and where appropriate determine the dollar amount.
A.

Medical
_ 1.

Nothing
2.

1 - 20%

3. 21

- ^0$

h. hi

- 60$

5 . 61

- 80$

6 . 81

- 100$

_____ 7 , 100$ and court
B.

costs

Car damages
_____ 1. Nothing
2 . 1 - 20%
3 . 21

- ho$

h.

hi

- 60%

5 . 61

- 80$

6 . 81

- 100$

7 - 100$ and inconveniences
$

______________

C.

Pain and suffering, indicate dollar amount:

V.

Please rate your feelings about the severity of the accident.
That is, the extent that you feel the plaintiff suffered.
Circle one:

I personally feel he suffered:

Not at all
0
1

Moderately
2
3
^

Very much
5
6

APPENDIX D
Analysis of Variance Tables and Figure
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Table I

Multivariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant Variable s

Source

df '

F

Locus of Control (L)

3

3.49*

Severity (S)

3

11.17**

Deservingne'ss (D)

3

<i

Within cell error N(L))

92

L x S

3

L x D

3

S x D

3

Within cell error (NS(L))

92

Within cell error (ND(L))

92

L x S x D

3

Within cell error (NSD(L))

*p < .01
**p

.001

92

1.36
<1
1.71

<1
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TABLE II

Multivariate Analysis of Variance
Plaintiff Variables

Source

df

Locus of Control (L)

3

5.6^*

Severity (S)

3

8.17*

Deservingness (D.)

3

18.68*

Within cell error (N(L))

92

L x S

3

L x D

3

L x D

3

Within cell error (NS(L))

92

Within cell error (i\JD(L))

92

L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))

*p.< .001

3
92

Ci

< i

< i
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TABLE III

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Responsibility Attributed to Defendant

Source

Locus of Control (L)
Severity (S)
Deservingness (D)
Within cell error (N(L))

df

hs

1

3.80

.1

28.62

12.94*

1

1.36

<1

1.32

<1

1

L x D

1

S x D

1

Within cell error (NS(L))

98

Within cell error (ND(L)')

98

Within cell error (NSD(L))

*p < .001

1.30

98

L x S

L x S x D

F

1
98

<1

<1

2.13

3.8O

1.34

2.72
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TABLE IV

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant License Suspension and/or Jail

Source

df

F

MS

Locus of Control (L)

1

< 1

Severity (S)

1

10.24

34.47*

Deservingness (D)

1

< 1

<1

Within cell error (N(L))

98

I. x 3

1

L x D

1

S x D

1

Within cell error (NS(L))

98

Within cell error (ND(L))

98
1

L x S x D
Within cell error (USD(L-))

*p <

.001

1.30

98

2.15
<1
1.21

< 1

^ 1
<

1
3.80

2.72
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TABLE V

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant Driver Re-education

Source

df

"hS

F

Locus of Control (L)

1

7.02

1.18

Severity (S)

1

31.92

17.81*

Deservingness (D)

1

3.06

Within cell error (N(L))

•

1

98

L x S

1

L x D

1

<1

<T1

S x D

1

<1

<1

<1

<

VTithin cell error (NS(L))

98

Within cell error (ND(L))

98

L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))

* p < .001

1
98

^.62

2.58

1
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TABLE VI

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant Fine Recommendations

Source

MS

Locus of Control (L)

1

<1

<1

Severity (S)

1

12.25

34.00**

1

27.04

< 1

.Deservingness (D)
Within cell error (N (L ))

98

L x S

1

L x D

1

S x D

1

Within cell error (NS(L)

98

Within cell error (ND(L))

98
1

I. x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))

*P

.05.

**p < .001

98

4.00*

1.69

< 1
<1

1.00

<

1

<

1
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TABLE VII

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Responsibility Attributed to Plaintiff

Source

df

F

MS

Locus of Control (L)

1

10.24

.4.05*

Severity (S)

1

2.56

2.52

Deservinpness (D)

1

98.01

Within cell error (l\l(L))

98

L x S

1

L x D

1

S x D

1

Within cell error (NS(L))

98

Within cell error (ND(L))

98

L x S x D

1

Within cell error (USD(L))

*p < .05
**p <

.001

72.01**

98

1.42

1.44.

< 1
< 1

<

< 1

< 1

1
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TABLE VIII

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Medical Expenses Covered by Plaintiff

Source

df

MS

Locus of Control (L)

1

<1

Severity (S)

1

12.25

Deservingness (D)

1

27.04

Within cell error (N(L))

< 1
4 .30*
11. 34

98

L x S

1

L x D

1

<1

<

1

S x D

1

<1

<

1

<

1

Within cell error (NS(L))

98

Wi thin cell er^or (UD(L))

98

L x S x D
Within cell error (USD(L))
t
*P < .05
**p

< .0 0 1

1
98

1.69

1.00

<1

TABLE IX

Univariate Analysis of Variances:
Auto Expenses Covered by Plaintiff

Source

df

MS

Locus of Control (L)

1

6.76

Severity (S)

1

1.21

1

10.24

Deservinsness
Within cell

(D)
error (W(L))

L x S

98
1

L x D

1

S x D

1

Within cell

error (NS(L))

98

Within cell

error (ND(L))

98

L x S x. D
Within cell

1
error (NSD(L))

98

2.89
< 1
1.21

<C 1
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TABLE X

Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Pain and Suffering Retributions

Source

df

MS

Locus of Control (L)

1

5^358.92

Severity (S')

1

< 1

10.21

Deservingness (D)

1

< 1

< 1

Within cell error (N(L))

< i

98

L x S

1

62489.60

< 1

L x D

1

< 1

< 1

S x D

1

< i

<

<

<1

Within cell error (NS(L))

98

Within cell error (ND(L))

•• 98

L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))

*p < .01

1
98

i

1

7b
TABLE XI

Univariate Analysis of Variance
Severity of Consequences

Source

df

Locus of Control (L).

1

Severity (S)

1

Deservingness (D)

1

Within cell error (h(L))

MS

<f 1

657.92
4

1

F

<1

573. 09*

<1

98
1

L x D

1

< 1

< 1

S x D

1

< 1

< 1

<1

<1

Within cell error (hS(L))

98

Within cell error (hD(L))

98

L x S x D

1

Within cell error (NSD(L))

*p <

.001

98

3.80

3.3I

L x S

75

2.80

2.60

^ 2.L-0
03
£

s
Sl
e/
£

2.20

2.00

1.80
Internals

Externals

Locus of Control
High Severity

•

Low Severity
Figure 2.

Relationship between severity of outcome and

locus of control.
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Means and Standard Deviation Tables
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TABLE XII

Means and Standard Deviations for Responsibility
Attribution Variables by Internal and External Subjects
High Victim Severity

Low Victim Severity

Dependent

Low Defendant

High Defendant Low Defendant

High Defendant.

Variables

Deservingness

Deservingness

Deservingness

W = 100
LDefendant

X

SD

X

3 .86

1.54

4.18

1.56

.89

3.10

SD

Deservingness
X

SD

X

SD

1.62

3.52

1.55

3.45

1.39

1.68

.86

1.35

.76

1.25

.69

1.86

3.32

1.95

2.58

1.72

2.71

1.69

2.55

1.62

2.6h

1.62

I .83

1.03

1.96

1.10

2.90

1.57

1.88

1.04

2.71

1.40

1.75

.96

2 .5A

I .89

1.96

1.77

2.13

1.81

1.6.7

1.45

2.58

1.90

2.15

1.92

2.36

I .87

2.15

1.94

responsi
bility
lLicense
suspensi on
or jail
LDri ver
re-ed
a'Fine
Plaintiff
respons!hi 1 ity
CM ed ica 1
expenses
'Auto
expenses
*Pain and

2432.11
104hh.?l

1623.26
2720.17

5.01

5.12

193.64
1499.17

160.62
9i3 .ll

2.^9

2.52

suffer!np
retributions
'Sever! ty

1.17

1.32

1.02

.87
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TABLE XIII

Means and Standard Deviations for Responsibility
Attribution Variables by Internal Subjects
High Victim Severity

Low Victim Severity

Dependent

Low Defendant

High Defendant Low Defendant

High Defendant

Variables

Deservingness

Deservingness

Deservingness

F = 50_________ X

Deservingness

SD

X

SD

X

3.88

1.59

4.08

l.?6

3.26

1.48

3.40

1.50

1.62

.88

1.72

.90

1.36

.78

1.18

.52

3.38

1.80

3.52

2.01

2.62

1.79

2.72

1.74

aFine

2.72

1.72

2.82

1.75

1.78

1.00

1.88

1.10

b

2.68

1.61

1.66

.96

2.64

1.45

1.62

.78

2.hO

2.00

1.96

1.94

2.22

1.96

1.70

1.53

2.56

2.08

2.26

2.14

2.60

2.05

2.34

2.16

Defendant

SD_______X

SD

responsibility
aT .
Li cense,
suspense on
jai 1
aDriver
re-ed

Flainti ff
responsibi.li ty

'Medical
expenses
'Auto
expenses
^Pain and

2912.02
14150.38

1370.02
2517.54

34.44

5.12-

5.24

2.34

46.52
89.32

169.76

suffering
retribut.i ons
Severity

1.21

1.39

.96

2.50

.91
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TABLE XIV

Leans and Standard Deviations for Responsibility
Attribution Variables by Externl;Subjects ■
High Victim Severity
Dependent

Low Defendant

Variables ' Deservingness
N = .5Q_________ X

High Defendant Low Defendant

High Defendant

Deservingness

Deservingness

SD

X

3.>

1.50

>.28

1.50

.91

1.64

2.82

1.90

lFine

2.38

Plaintiff

‘Defendant

Low Victim Severity

Deservingness

SD_______X
1M

SD_______X

SD

3.?8

1.58

3.50

1.69

.83

1.34

.75

1.32

.82

3.12

1.89

2.54

1.67

2.70

1.66

1.51

2.46

1.47

1.88

1.06

2.04

1.11

3-12

1.51

2.10

1.07

2.78

1.36

1.88

1.10

2.68

1.80

1.96

1.60

2.04

I .67

1 .64

I .38

2.60

1.71

2.04

1.69

2.12

I .65

1.96

1.69

response bili ty
•
License

lT

suspension
or jail
lDriver
re-ed

responsibilit.y
"Kedi cal
expenses
'Auto
expenses
'fain and

1952.20
4439.24

I876.5O
2912.17

352.84
2116.88

274.72
1276.38

4.90

5.02

2.64

2.54

suf feri ng
retri bntion?
'Severity

1.13

1.24

1.06

.84
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Footnotes For Means and
Standard Deviation Tables
SL
The higher the mean, the greater the responsibility, license
suspense on/jai1, driver re-education, and fine assigned the
defendant.
b

The higher the mean, the greater the responsibility assigned.

cThe higher the mean, the more the plaintiff pays medical and
auto expenses.
^The higher the mean, the greater the retributions awarded
the plaintiff.
eThe higher the mean, the greater the severity judged for the
plaintiff.

